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HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND THE GROUP
BOYCOTT RULE
The hospital is the focal point of modern health care) Hospitals provide the techni-
cal equipment and specialized support personnel necessary for today's increasingly
sophisticated medical procedures. 2
 Modern health practitioners' need hospital access in
order to provide their patients with every available type of treatment.' Moreover, prac-
titioners without hospital access have difficulty attracting patients since they cannot offer
a full range of services.' Thus, hospital access is virtually indispensable for today's health
practitioner.''
To gain hospital access, practitioners must obtain hospital staff privileges.? Staff
privileges represent permission from the hospital's governing body for the practitioner to
admit patients to the hospital and direct the care given to them." Most hospitals adminis-
ter privileges selectively. 9
 Privilege applicants are evaluated by the hospital's medical staff,
an organization of all the practitioners who currently have staff privileges."' The medical
staff makes recommendations to the hospital board, which makes the final decision to
grant privileges." This decision should be based on an objective evaluation of the
applicant's credentials." In practice, however, qualified applicants are often denied
privileges for reasons wholly unrelated to individual merit."
Unsuccessful applicants always have been able to challenge privilege denials in court
on procedural due process and civil rights grounds." Until recently, however, state and
federal antitrust statutes were unavailable because most courts considered the learned
professions, including medicine, to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny." The Supreme
Court explicitly rejected this exemption in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,` ° holding that the
practice of a learned profession is "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the
1 Goldsmith & Bertolet, The Present Status of Physician Privileges, 1981 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121,
121 (hereinafter cited as Goldsmith); Kessnick, Physicians' Access to the Hospital: An Overview, 14
U.S.F.L. REV. 43, 43-44 (1979); Note, Denial of Open Staff Privileges: An Antitrust Scrutiny, 26 ST. LOUIS
U.L.J. 751, 752 (1982) (hereinafter cited as An Antitrust Scrutiny).
2 Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 121.
3 As used in this note, the term "health practitioner" refers to anyone licensed by the state to
perform medical procedures without supervision. This includes physicians, dentists, chiropractors,
podiatrists, psychologists and nurse practitioners.
• Goldsmith, supra note I, at 121.
▪ Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and The Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. Rev. 707,
713-14 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Dolan & Ralston).
• Goldsmith, supra note I, at 121.
• Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 709.
o Id.
o An Antitrust Scrutiny, supra note 1 at 752.
'° Id. Kissam, Webber, Bigus and Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conven-
tional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 606 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Kissam); JOINT COMMISSION ON
THE ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCRED-MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: 1979 Edition, at 53 (Standard
IX) (hereinafter cited as JCAH MANUAL). See infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
" An Antitrust Scrutiny, supra note 1, at 752.
12 Id.
' 3 Kissam, supra note 10, at 599.
" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 725-26.
' 5 Kissam, supra note 10, at 614. See infra text accompanying notes 409-11.
IS 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Sherman Antitrust. Act." Following Goldfarb, most state courts no longer recognize a
learned profession exemption to state antitrust statutes.' Accordingly, unsuccessful
applicants now can challenge privilege denials on state and federal antitrust as well
as procedural due process and civil rights grounds."
Since Goldfarb, most court challenges to privilege denials have been based on the
Sherman Antitrust Act rather than on state antitrust, procedural due process, or civil
rights grounds." The Sherman Act is preferable to procedural due process and civil
rights theories because.it provides treble damages and attorneys fees to successful plain-
tiffs." It is also preferable to state antitrust theories because Sherman Act challenges can
be brought before federal judges" who are more likely to be insulated from the political
influence of powerful local hospitals and medical associations.
Although a large number of Sherman Act challenges to privilege denials have been
filed in the lower federal courts,' 3 a plaintiff practitioner has yet to prevail on the merits."
Plaintiff practitioners lose for several reasons. First, until recently,' many practitioners
have been unable to demonstrate that the challenged privilege denial affects interstate
commerce sufficiently to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction." Second, even when a
sufficient effect on interstate commerce is demonstrated, Sherman Act jurisdiction is
defeated where the defendant demonstrates that the privilege denial was somehow
" Id. at 789. Section one of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is ...
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1972).
Section two of the Act provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony, . ." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
15 See e.g., Health Corp. of America v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1977)
(dental profession not exempt from New Jersey antitrust statute); Douglas v. Hospital of San Rafael,
33 Conn. Supp. 216, 371 A.2d 396 (Super. Ct. 1976) (anesthesiologists not exempt from Connecticut
antitrust statute).
" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 535.
2 ° An Antitrust Scrutiny, supra note 1, at 753.
11 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1981).
23 See, e.g., Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346 .
 (7th Cir. 1982);
DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1982); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir.
1981); Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Systems, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,342 (10th Cir. 1981);
Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981); Levinski v. Reese Hosp., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,789 (N.D. III. 1982); Cardio-Medical Associates v. Crozer-Chester Medical
Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065 (F.D. Pa. 1982); Everhart v. Jane Stormont Hosp., 1982-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 11 64,703 (D. Kan. 1982); Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Mich. 1981);
Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Barr v. National Right to Life Comm.,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,315 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 513 F. Supp.
532 (E.D. La. 1981), rev'd 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir, 1982), cert. granted, U.S. 51 U.S.L.W. 3649
(1983).
11 An Antitrust Scrutiny, supra note 1, at 753. But see Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, U.S._, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983), in which the Fifth Circuit reversed a
lower court holding in favor of a hospital. The significance of this decision is unclear in light of the
pending review by the Supreme Court. For a further discussion of the case, see infra note 335.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 163-95.
" See, e.g., Moles v.. Morton Plant Hosp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,600 at 77,189. For a
discussion of the interstate commerce requirement, and its role in privilege denial cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 163-70.
March 1984]	 GROUP BOYCOTT RULE	 385
mandated by state regulation." Third, even when Sherman Act jurisdiction is established,
proof of a Sherman Act violation has been extremely difficult in the privilege denial
context." Proof of a violation has been difficult in this context because, of the two
alternative Sherman Act analyses, rule of reason and per se, most courts have uniformly
used the rule of reason in privilege denial challenges." Under the rule of reason, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of the challenged practice
outweigh its procompetitive effects. 3° Such a showing is extremely difficult and expensive
because it requires a detailed study of the trade patterns of an entire industry." The
alternative Sherman Act analysis, the per se approach," heretofore not used in privilege
denial cases, is less difficult and expensive than the rule of reason approach for the
antitrust plaintiff because the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the actual anticom-
petitive effects of the challenged practice. 33 Under the per se approach, a plaintiff need
only demonstrate that the challenged practice falls into one of the recognized per se
categories, 34 and the court will make a conclusive presumption of illegality." This pre-
sumption of illegality employed in the per se approach greatly lightens the antitrust
plaintiff's burden of proof and increases his chances of success on the merits in contrast to
the rule of reason, where no such presumption is employed."
The exclusive use of the rule of reason rather than the per se approach in privilege
denial cases" has been premised on language in the Supreme Court's Goldfarb decision.38
Although Goldfarb declared the professions under the ambit of the Sherman Act, 3 °
language in the case expressly left open the possibility that anticompetitive practices
which would violate the Sherman Act if engaged in by other industries might be permissi-
ble for the professions." Based on this language, courts have held that a full rule of
reason analysis is necessary in all cases involving the professions, since activities consid-
ered per se illegal in non-professional contexts might be justifiable when practiced by the
2-7 See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp, 1258, 1268
(N.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). For a discussion
of the state action defenses, and their role in privilege denial cases, see infra text accompanying notes
186-92.
" Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases: Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26 S.D.L. Rev. 1, 1 (1981).
23 See infra text accompanying note 411.
33 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 343 n.13 (1982).
31 Id, at 343.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 206.07 and note 20.
33 Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44.
34 The per se offenses currently recognized by the court are price fixing, division of markets,
group boycotts and tying arrangements. Id. at 344 n.15. Price fixing is the cooperative setting of price
levels by competing firms. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Co-op Ass'n, 326 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa.
1971). Division of markets is the cooperative allocation of territories by competitors. United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 597 (1972). Tying arrangements exist when a person agrees to
sell one product, the "tying product," only on the condition that the vendee also purchase another
product, the tied product. Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2c1 1336, 1344 (8th Cir. 1976).
Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 344-45.
33 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 741.
37 See Everhart v. Jane Stormont Medical Hosp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)11 64, 703 at 73, 897
and cases cited therein.
38 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
3° Id. at 785-87.
40
 Id. at 787 n.17.
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professions." This reasoning recently was rejected by the Supreme Court, however, in
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Association.' In Maricopa, the Court held that the per se
rule against price fixing applies with full force to health care professionals." The Court
reasoned that the trade practices prohibited by the per se rules are so clearly anticompeti-
tive that a presumption of illegality is warranted in professional as well as non-
professional contexts." This reasoning supports the position that the professions, includ-
ing the medical profession, are no longer exempt from the per se rules." Accordingly, the
per se approach should now be available to practitioners challenging staff privilege de-
nials."
This article concerns the use of the per se approach in privilege denial challenges.
Specifically, the article focuses on the group boycott rule," the per se rule designed to deal
with situations where traders collectively refuse to deal with another trader." The group
boycott rule is the applicable per se rule in the privilege denial context because, in essence,
privilege denials are collective refusals by a hospital and its medical staff to deal with the
applicant practitioner." The availability of the group boycott rule in privilege denial
challenges will depend on two factors: first, whether the challenged privilege denial can
be characterized as a group boycott," and, second, whet her the court will adopt a per se
approach in the privilege denial context, that is, allow the plaintiff practitioner to rely on
the presumption that group boycotts are per se anticompetitive." If the group boycott per
se rule were available in privilege denial challenges, the showing of anticompetitive effects
necessary under the rule of reason would be obviated, 52 thereby lightening the plaintiff's
burden of proof and increasing his chances of success on the merits," The increased
threat of successful challenges to privilege denials will force hospitals to grant privileges to
all applicants absent a legitimate, verifiable reason for denial."
The primary thesis of this note is that the group boycott rule should apply to staff
privilege denials absent a specific exemption by Congress. Application of the rule would
force hospitals to grant privileges more liberally." Liberal granting of staff privileges
would benefit the consumer of medical services in three ways. First, hospital patients will
have greater freedom in choosing both their practitioner" and their hospital." Second,
both practitioners and hospitals will have -greater incentive to lower prices and increase
quality of services in order to attract patients." Third, the medical profession will be
" See, e.g., Everhart v. Jane Stormont Medical Hosp., 1982-I Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,703 at
73,897.
" 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
43 Id. at 351.
44 Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 440-57.
45
 Id. See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,	 U.S.
51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983).
" For a description of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes 212-94.
" Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 60
- 73.
'° See infra text accompanying notes 212-401.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 402- 75.
" See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
53 Id.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 458-75.
55 See infra text accompanying note 475.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 134-42.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 131
- 33.
" See infra text accompanying notes 91 - 126.
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encouraged to act against incompetent practitioners at the state licensing level, rather
than merely deny them privileges and allow them to continue practicing on unsuspecting
patients outside the hospital."
Part I will examine the administration of hospital privileges in general and the
problems that arise because of the conflicting interests of the various parties involved.
Part II will examine the Sherman Act, with particular emphasis on the purposes and
development of the per se rules. Part III will analyze the group boycott precedent to
ascertain whether privilege denials constitute the type of behavior courts have tradition-
ally characterized as group boycott. Part IV will examine recent Sherman Act precedent
involving the professions to determine whether the professions in general, and privilege
denials in particular, are exempt from the full force of the group boycott per se rule.
Finally, Part V will assess the potential impact of the group boycott rule on privilege
administration, and examine the policy reasons for applying the group boycott rule in this
context.
I. THE HOSPITAL PRIVILEGE SYSTEM
Hospital staff privileges are the embodiment of a cooperative agreement between a
hospital and a practitioner to exchange services." The hospital provides the practitioner
with hospital facilities by allowing the practitioner to admit patients to the hospital and
direct the care given to them.'" In exchange, the practitioner agrees to bring paying
patients to the hospital." Thus, the hospital privilege system can be viewed as a system of
"contracts" between suppliers of complementary services whereby each party provides the
necessary missing element in the other's service. 63
A hospital's decision to enter a "contract" with a given practitioner by granting him
staff privileges is not made freely by the hospital administration. 64
 The hospital's decision
to grant privileges is controlled primarily by the hospital's medical staff," the group of
practitioners with privileges at a given hospital." The medical staff makes recommenda-
tions to the hospital administration concerning each applying practitioner." In most
hospitals, the administration routinely adopts the medical staff recommendation." In the
few hospitals where the administration makes an additional, independent evaluation,
disagreements between the administration and the medical staff are resolved by a joint
administration-staff committee. 63
 Thus, while in theory the hospital administration is the
final authority on all hospital related issues," in practice the administration never unilat-
59 See infra part V.
69 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 709.
" Id.
62
 Kissam, supra note 10, at 606; M. ROEMER AND J. FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAI.




 JCAH MANUAL, supra note 10, at 53 (Standard IX).
es Id.
66
 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 710.
" JCAH MANUAL, supra note 10, at 53 (Standard IX).
68
 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 712; Horty & Mullholand, The Legal Status of the Hospital
Medical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485, 487-488 (1978); Kissam, supra note 10, at 651.
ea JCAH MANUAL, supra note 10, at 53-54.
7° Kissam, supra note 10, at 606.
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erally makes the final decision concerning privilege applicants." Privilege decisions are
made either by the medical staff alone, or by agreement between the staff and the hospital
administration:" The medical staff, therefore, a group comprised of separate, competing
business entities bound together only by their contractual relationships with a common
supplier of hospital facilities, controls the access of potential competitors to the hospital
facilities.
The medical staff's unfettered power to deny hospital access to competitors is abused
when privileges are denied for reasons unrelated to the applicant's credentials." It is this
abuse that necessitates a strong legal response such as application of the group boycott per
se rule. To understand how and why the abuse occurs, and the effect of the group boycott
rule on the hospital privilege system, it is necessary to examine the conflicting interests
and roles of the participants in privilege administration. Accordingly, the next four
subsections discuss individually the interests and roles of the applicant practitioner, the
medical staff, the hospital administration and the patient, in privilege administration. The
final subsection describes the most common abuses of privilege denial power, abuses
which could be stopped through application of the group boycott rule."
A. The Applicant Practitioner
Practitioners applying for privileges at a hospital either have no privileges at any
hospital, or enjoy privileges at one or more other hospitals." Applicants without staff
privileges at other hospitals are generally young practitioners just beginning to practice or
practitioners who have recently moved into the area." A complete lack of access to
hospital facilities is. likely to make these practitioners unattractive to patients for at least
two reasons. First, potential patients assume that if the hospital will not allow the prac-
titioner on its staff, the practitioner must be incompetent." Second, potential patients
fear that if they ever need hospital services, they will be forced to switch to another
practitioner." In addition to being unattractive to patients, practitioners without privi-
leges risk losing the patients they do attract as soon as the patients require hospital
services." The non-privileged practitioner must refer these patients to privileged prac-
titioners, and thereby risk losing patients who want to "eliminate the middleman." 8 °
Moreover, non-privileged practitioners are denied two important sources of new patients:
in-house referrals from other members of the medical staff," and emergency room
cases." Thus, non-privileged practitioners have a distinct competitive disadvantage com-
" Id,
72 Id.; Note, Physician-hospital Conflict: The Hospital Staff Privileges Controversy in New York, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1076-77 (1975).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 145-58.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 300 - 401.
Compare Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 913 (W.D. Pa. 1981), appeal docketed, No.
81-2726 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1981) (plaintiff already has privileges at three hospitals) with Barr v.
National Right to Life Comm., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,315 at 74,408 (M.D. Fla, 1981)
(plaintiff has no privileges at any hospital).
" See, e.g., Barr, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 74,407 (plaintiff has just relocated his practice).
77 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 714.
78 Id. at 713.
7" Id .
8° Id.
" Id. at 714.
" Id.
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pared with privileged practitioners for attracting and keeping new patients. 83 In many
cases," privileges will mean the differences between success and failure for a new
practitioner."
Not all applicant practitioners are without privileges elsewhere." Often, established
practitioners who already have privileges at one or more hospitals will apply for addi-
tional privileges at other hospitals." Additional privileges allow the practitioner to offer
patients greater freedom of choice." Greater freedom of choice is likely to attract patients
to practitioners with staff privileges at many hospitals." Moreover, additional staff privi-
leges allow the practitioner access to the 'referral and emergency room sources of patients
at an additional hospital." Thus, like the young practitioner seeking his first staff
privileges, the. established practitioner seeking additional privileges usually does so to
enhance his ability to compete for new patients.
B. The Medical Staff
The enhanced ability to compete for new patients which is sought by the privilege
applicant is already enjoyed by the members of the medical staff.'" Moreover, the law of
supply and demand" dictates that this competitive advantage will diminish as more
privileges are granted." The competitive advantage decreases because the supply of
privileged practitioners rises while the demand for them, the number of patients seek-
ing privileged practitioners, remains constant." The result is fewer new patients for each
83 See supra text accompanying notes 77 - 82.
" The need for privileges is most acute for practitioners who specialize in surgery, anesthesiol-
ogy, pathology and radiology, all of which require hospital facilities. Ralston, supra note 5, at 713.
Nevertheless, virtually all practitioners need the diagnostic, recuperative and backup facilities pro-
vided by hospitals. Id.
83' Goldsmith, supra note I, at 121.
88 See supra note 75.
" See, e.g., Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 913 (W.D. Pa. 1981), appeal docketed, No.
81.2726 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 1981) (Plaintiff already had privileges at three area hospitals); Williams v.
Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (Plaintiff already had privileges at another
hospital).
88 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 709. Since patients can be treated only in hospitals where
their practitioner has privileges, patients will have a choice of hospitals only if their practitioner has
privileges at more than one hospital. Id.
" Of course, only patients who have a preference between hospitals will be attracted.
" See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. It must be acknowledged that additional staff
privileges bring new responsibilities as well as new patients. As noted earlier, hospitals generally
require members of the medical staff to perform some hospital work. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. Additional privileges thus entail additional hospital work. Furthermore, it is far
less difficult and time-consuming for a practitioner to visit patients if they are all in one hospital than
if they are spread out among many hospitals.
" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 714-15.
" The law of supply and demand states that the value of a commodity is determined, in part, by
the relationship between the amount of the commodity available and the number of individuals who
want the commodity. Other things being equal, as the demand rises, to will the value. For a discussion
of the rule, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 423-25 (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1961).
93 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 715.
9' In practice, of course, the supply of patients does not remain constant. Nevertheless, the
supply of patients does not fluctuate in response to the granting of staff privileges, and is therefore
fixed with regard to that variable. Accordingly, increases in the number of privileged practitioners
will necessarily decrease the number of patients that each practitioner has available.
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privileged practitioner," Consequently, there is a strong incentive for the practitioners on
the medical staff to vote to deny staff privileges to all applicants in order to hold down
competition.
The staff practitioner's incentive to deny privileges may be influenced by the charac-
teristics of the particular applicant under consideration. 9° For example, the incentive to
deny privileges may be strengthened when the applicant is in one's own specialty and thus
represents direct competition," Similarly, the incentive to deny privileges may be affected
by the applicant's trade practices. 98
 Applicants who offer prices and services that are more
attractive than the prices and services offered by staff practitioners are likely to lure
patients away from staff practitioners." Accordingly, the incentive to deny privileges to
these applicants is strengthened. A similar incentive to deny privileges arises when the
applicant offers an alternative mode of treatment for the same illnesses handled by the
staff practitioner.'°° Applicant osteopaths,"' chiropractors,'" and psychologists 103 pose
this threat to staff allopaths,'" orthopedists, 10 ' and psychiatrists"° respectively. The
incentive to deny privileges to the "alternative"'" practitioners is particularly strong
because the "alternative" practitioners frequently offer less expensive and more pleasant
modes of treatment which are likely to lure patients away from the "traditional" staff
practitioners.'"
" See supra note 93.
" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 714-16.
°T Id. at 715. For example, a staff orthopedic surgeon is more likely to vote to deny privileges to
another surgeon than to a general practitioner. From the staff orthopedic surgeon's point of view,
another orthopedic surgeon inevitably will hurt business while a general practitioner will not. This
follows from the fact, noted supra note 101, that the number of patients seeking orthopedic surgery
at any given moment is fixed. The more orthopedic surgeons there are, the lower the number of
patients for each surgeon. On the other hand, increases in the number of general practitioners will
not lower the number of patients for each orthopedic surgeon, since general practitioners are not
competing for the same patients. Moreover, the general practitioner may refer patients who need
orthopedic surgery to the staff orthopedic surgeon. The applicant general practitioner represents a
potential source of new patients, while the applicant orthopedic surgeon represents a potential
competitor for them.
" Trade practice here means the practitioner's policy regarding fees, house calls, office hours
and other services. For example, a staff obstetrician who refuses to perform home births has a strong
incentive to deny privileges to an applicant obstetrician who performs home births. Competition
from such an applicant may force the staff obstetrician to begin performing home births to avoid
losing patients.
" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 715.
'no id.
1 ° 1 "Osteopaths undergo training regimens quite similar to that of M.D. practitioners, except
that greater emphasis is placed on family practice and on some manipulative practices." Id. at 728.
102 Chiropractors believe' that most medical disorders are caused by misalignments of the
vertebrae, These misalignments are treated by manipulation, See generally J. DENTENFASS, CHIRO-
pRAcrtc: A MODERN WAY TO HEALTH (1970).
'°3 Psychologists receive Ph.D. degrees in psychology and are qualified to treat patients with
psychological therapy. Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 728.
' 84 Allopaths are traditional M.D. practitioners. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 56 (1976).
"5 Orthopedists are M.D. practitioners who specialize in treating skeletal maladies, including
those involving the spine. Id. at 1594.
108
 Psychiatrists are M.D. practitioners who specialize in the treatment of mental illness. Id. at
1832. Unlike psychologists, psychiatrists can prescribe drugs. Id..
107
 "AlternatiVe" as used here denotes non-M.D. practitioners.
'" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 708. The staff practitioner's incentive to deny privileges is
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In summary, privilege administration provides the medical staff with the ability to
regulate competition in their own industry.' 09 There is no reason to assume that health
practitioners, unlike other businessmen, are immune from the desire to minimize compe-
tition and maximize profits. The desire to minimize competition results in an incentive to
deny privileges to all applicants, regardless of competence."° The freedom of the medical
staff to act on this incentive is the central problem in current privilege administration."'
C. The Hospital Administration
The primary interest of the hospital administration is maximizing revenue," The
best way to maximize revenue is to keep all the hospital's beds full and the hospital's
facilities operating at full capacity." At first glance, it would appear that the most
effective way to accomplish this end is to maximize the number of privileged practitio-
ners. This conclusion, however, rests on the mistaken premises that more practitioners
mean more patients, and more patients mean more revenue. The reality of hospital
economics is far more complicated.
Increasing the number of privileged practitioners does not necessarily increase the
number of patients because not all practitioners have the same patient-drawing potential.
Well-known, established practitioners attract more patients than unknown, young prac-
titioners. It is in the hospital administration's best interest to keep as many well-known
practitioners as possible on its medical staff."' If these well-known practitioners become
discontented with the hospital administration, they may seek additional privileges else-
where or leave the medical staff. In either case, the hospital stands to lose patients and
money. Accordingly, the hospital administration tends to give these well-known prac-
titioners what they want." 9 This tendency strongly affects privilege administration. 19
Privilege decisions made by the medical staff are often approved by the hospital adminis-
tration to keep the valuable, established practitioners on the staff happy.'" Thus, the
hospital administration's interest in maximizing revenue by keeping well-known prac-
titioners on the medical staff translates into routine approval of privilege decisions made
by the medical staff. 1 e Since the medical staff generally wants to minimize competition," 9
hospital administrations seek to minimize rather than maximize the number of privileged
practitioners in order to attract the greatest number of patients.'"
also increased where the applicant has a record of incompetence. Id. at 715. Incompetent practitio-
ners hurt the reputation of the medical staff as a whole and affect their ability to attract patients. Id.
If the incompetent practitioner is sued for malpractice, the other members of the staff are called on
to review the incident and testify. Id. This type of investigation is difficult and time-consuming. Id.
Moreover, investigation of the competence of a member of the staffs sets a dangerous precedent, for
the competence of staff members is no longer beyond question. Id.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
'" Id.
'" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 716.
" 2 Id.
'" Id.
'" Kissam, supra note 10, at 611.
" s Joskow, The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed Supply and the Reservation
Quality of the Hospital, 11 BELL J. ECON. 421, 432, 445-46 (1980).
1 " Kissam, supra note 10, at 611.
'" Id.
1 " See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 98-123.
Kissarn, supra note 10, at 610-11.
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The scenario is further complicated by the fact that more patients do not necessarily
mean more revenue."' The revenue generated by each patient varies depending on the
length of stay and the number of hospital facilities used.' 22
 The best way to attract high
revenue generating patients is to attract their practitioners to the hospital's medical staff.
Accordingly, the hospital administration seeks to grant privileges to practitioners who:
(1) treat conditions requiring many hospital services; (2) favor methods of treatment that.
involve many hospital services; (3) readily admit their patients to hospitals; and (4) favor
long hospital stays. 123
The hospital board's interest in maximizing revenue thus results in selective privilege
administration."' Primarily, the hospital board seeks to placate well-known, and
high patient-producing members of the medical staff." Secondarily, the hospital board
seeks to attract practitioners who favor high revenue-producing modes of treatment.'"
D. The Patient
The patient, unlike the applicant practitioner, the medical staff, and the hospital
board, does not actively participate in privilege administration."' The care the patient
will receive, however, and the price he will pay for it, is profoundly influenced by privilege
decisions."' To illustrate the effect of privilege decisions on hospital patients, it is useful
to group hospital patients in two categories: (1) patients who have a chosen practitioner
and are choosing a hospital;' 29
 and (2) patients who have a chosen hospital and are
choosing a practitioner.'"
Group 1 patients can he admitted only to hospitals where their chosen practitioner has
staff privileges. 121
 This requirement restricts their freedom of choice by preventing these
"' Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 716.
122 Id. For example, a cancer patient would probably produce more revenue than a routine
pregnancy. The cancer patient requires many hospital services, such as diagnostic testing, surgery,
and radiation, not required by the pregnant patient. Since use of hospital services generates revenue
for the hospital, the hospital administration is interested in attracting patients who require the
greatest array of hospital services.
121
 Id. at 720.
Kissam, .supra note 10, at 610.
" 5
 See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
12" See supra text accompanying notes 122-23. In addition to maximizing revenue, the hospital
board attempts to avoid malpractice liability. Dolan & Ralston,supra note 5, at 707-18; Kissam,supra
note 10, at 608-09; McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending, and Granting Staff Privileges,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 205-13 (1980). In many states, hospitals are liable for negligence in the
selection and assignment of staff members, even when the staff members are not salaried hospital
employees. See, e.g., Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); J. KING. THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 304 (1977). Accordingly, the hospital board,
like the medical staff, has a strong incentive to deny privileges to incompetent applicants. See supra
text accompanying notes 98-106.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
' 2 ' Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 718.
" 9
 This group comprises the majority of patients because most have an established relationship
with a particular practitioner.
"fl Patients may insist on being at a particular hospital because of the hospital location, size,
religious character, or reputation for excellence. These patients will often choose a practitioner
merely because he is on the medical staff of their chosen hospital.
1 " This follows from the fact that practitioners may only admit patients at hospitals where the
practitioner has privileges. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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patients from shopping among all hospitals for the greatest array of services and the
lowest prices. Since patients are not free to shop among hospitals, hospitals have no
incentive to increase the services offered or lower prices.'" This lack of incentive trans-
lates into poor service, high prices, and high health insurance premiums for everyone. 133
Group 2 patients, those who have chosen a hospital and are choosing a practitioner,
are also directly affected by privilege administration. The Group 2 patient's choice of
practitioner is limited to those practitioners with privileges at the patient's chosen hospi-
tal.'" Accordingly, the patient is not free to choose the practitioner who offers the
combination of service, price, and reputation that best satisfies the patient's needs.' 35 Most
of the patient's choices have been eliminated by selective privilege administration. Among
the remaining choices, the staff practitioners, the level of competition in terms of service,
price, and reputation is likely to be low since the staff practitioners themselves control
privilege administration.'" By keeping the staff small and eliminating applicants that
pose competitive threats, the medical staff can set prices and services at any level and still
avoid losing patients.' 37 The patients must accept the terms offered by the medical staff
or leave the hospital. Since Group 2 patients, by definition, do not want to leave the
hospital,'" they must accept a member of the medical staff on his terms. Certain types of
practitioners, such as chiropractors, osteopaths, and psychologists may be completely
unavailable." Among the available practitioners, it is unlikely that "extra" services such
as house calls or extended office hours will be available.'" Moreover, available practitio-
ners are likely to be those that favor long hospital stays and extensive use of hospital
facilities."' Since only the most expensive modes of treatment are available, patient costs
rise and health insurance premiums follow.'"
In summary, more liberal privilege administration, and the resulting increase in
competition both between hospitals and between practitioners clearly would benefit all
hospital patients. Consequently, the interests of the hospital patient in privilege adminis-
t ration compete directly with the interests of the medical staff and the hospital board.'"
The patient and the privilege applicant generally benefits when privileges are granted.
The medical staff and the hospital board generally benefit when privileges are denied.
Since the latter groups control privilege administration, the former groups must depend
on the courts to protect their interests. This dependence accounts for the large volume of
132 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 721.
133 Id. Moreover, in localities where there is a shortage of hospital beds, a patient who is
restricted in his choice of hospitals will wait longer for a bed. The wait is longer because the patient
cannot take the first available bed in the area, but must wait until a bed opens in the hospital where
his chosen practitioner has privileges. Consequently, privilege administration directly affects the
waiting period for hospital beds and the price and quality of hospital services for the Group 1 patient.
" 4 See supra note 131.
'" Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 720-21.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
137 Id.
4 " See supra text accompanying note 130.
in See supra text accompanying notes 100-08.
"° See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 121-23,
'" Id.
13 Compare supra text accompanying notes 123-37 (patient's interests) with supra text accompany-
ing notes 112-26 (hospital board's interests) and supra text accompanying notes 91-111 (medical
staff's interests).
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privilege-related litigation.' 44 In the following section, the most common types of privi-
lege-related litigation are described.
E. Privilege-Related Litigation
The vast majority of privilege-related litigation involves privilege denials that are non-
merit-based." 5 In these cases, the privilege denial is not based on the applicant's compe-
tence as a practitioner, but on some other factor such as the applicant's chosen specialty'"
or trade practices."' Three types of non-merit-based denials are particularly common:
contract-based, class-based, and retaliatory.
Contract-based privilege denials occur where a hospital board has given a group of
practitioners the exclusive right to practice their specialty at the hospital.'" Under such a
contract, the hospital agrees not to allow other practitioners to practice the contract
group's specialty at the hospital. 199 In exchange, the contract group may agree to turn
over a set percentage of their fees to the hospital.'" Once an exclusive contract is in place,
privilege applicants in t he contract specialty who are not members of the cont ract group
are denied privileges routinely, regardless of individual merit.' 5 '
Class-based privilege denials occur where the hospital board or medical staff has a
general policy against granting privileges to a certain class of practitioners. 152 Non-M.D.
practitioners such as podiatrists, chiropractors, and psychologists are common targets of
class-based denials.'" Privilege applicants in these classes, notwithstanding their state
licenses, are routinely denied privileges at many hospitals regardless of individual
merit." 4
Retaliatory privilege denials occur where the hospital board or medical staff wants to
discourage a particular practice such as association with Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions,'" or performance of abortions or home births.' 50
 Privilege applicants who engage
" 4 See supra text accompanying note 23.
14$ Dolan
 & Ralston, supra note 5, at 728-35.
148 See supra note 97.
"T See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
I" See, e.g., Santos v. Columbus -Coneo -Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir.
1982); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, U.S. 51
U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983).
' 49 See, e.g., Santos v. Columbus -Cuneo -Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir.
1982) (Contract provided that no anesthesiologists outside the contract group would be permitted to
practice in the hospital); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, U.S._, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983) (Contract provided that no anesthesiologists outside the
contract group would be permitted to practice in the hospital).
'" See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
U.S.	 51 U.S. L.W. 3649 (1983) (Hospital billed patient for anesthesiology services, subtracted eight
percent for overhead, then split remaining receipts with contract group).
"I See, e.g., Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir.
1982); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,	 U.S.
51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983).
152 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hospital Authority of Cobb County, 614 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1980).
"3 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 727-28.
'" Id.
155 See, e.g., Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Stipp. 912, 915 (W.D. Mich. 1981). Health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) are practitioner groups which bill their patients on a flat-rate-per-
period rather than on a fee-for-service basis. Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and The Role of
Antitrust Law, 1978 DUKE L. J. 487, 488.
1 " See, e.g., Barr v. National Right to Life Comm., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) Q 64,315 at 74,407
(M.D. Fla. 1981).
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in these forbidden activities are routinely denied privileges at many hospitals regardless
of individual merit. 157
Contract-based, class-based, and retaliatory privilege denials represent. the most
blatant abuses of regulatory power currently occurring in staff privilege administra-
tion.'" The development of an efficient legal response to these abuses is the primary
focus of the following sections.
II. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND THE PER SE RULES
The preceding part examined the administration of hospital privileges, and the
problems that arise because of the conflicting interests of the parties involved. In prepara-
tion for discussing the Sherman Act Group Boycott Rule as a possible legal response to
these problems, this part will discuss the Sherman Act in general. Emphasis will be placed
on the purposes and development of the per se rules and particularly on the Group Boycott
Rule.
The Sherman Act, 15 " enacted in 1890, has been the preeminent federal antitrust
statute for nearly 100 years.'" Section One of the Act proscribes agreements which
restrain free trade in interstate commerce. 1 e' Section Two of the Act proscribes
monopolization of an 'area of trade by one or more actors.'"
Under either section, a plaintiff must invoke Sherman Act. jurisdiction by proving
that the challenged restraint has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.'" Until
recently, a plaintiff could meet this requirement by showing that the particular restraint.
of trade challenged had a direct and purposeful effect on interstate commerce.'" In two
recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has substantially altered this requirement.
First, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,'" the Supreme Court held that
although the Sherman Act requires that the challenged restraint have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, such effect need not be either direct or purposeful.'" Second, in
McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,'" the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
need only show that defendant's total activities, independent of t he challenged restraint,
substantially affect interstate commerce.'" Under McLain and Rex Hospital, a plaintiff
may successfully invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction if he can prove that the defendant's
total business activities have even an indirect and unintended effect on interstate com-
merce. In actions challenging t he denial of staff privileges, plaintiff practitioners should
meet this requirement easily because most defendant hospitals either purchase some
supplies from out-of-state sources or bill out-of-state insurers.'" Accordingly, the Sher-
15' Dolan Sc Ralston, supra note 5, at 734.
' 58 Id. at 727; Kissam, supra note 10, at 598-99.
'" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
160 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 144 (3d ed. 1981).
' 6 ' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See supra note 17.
' 62 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See supra note 17.
"3
 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 233 (1977).
' 64 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 337-39 (1952).
' 65
 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
' 66 Id. at 744.
1B7 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
l" Id. at 246.
' 99 See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 741 (1976).
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man Act's interstate commerce requirement should no longer be an impediment to
privilege denial cases.'"
Even where plaintiff establishes the requisite connection between defendant's busi-
ness activities and interstate commerce, three affirmative defenses are available that will
defeat Sherman Act jurisdiction. First, under Parker v. Brown,'" federal antitrust jurisdic-
tion does not exist if the challenged restraint of trade is mandated by state regulations.' 72
In a recent case, however, California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,'"
the Supreme Court greatly limited the availability of this defense. Under Midcal, it is not
enough that the challenged restraint of trade be "necessary" for the implementation of
the state regulatory scheme.'" Rather, the challenged restraint must also be "clearly
articulated anti affirmatively expressed""s as state policy, and "actively supervised" 176 by
he state itself. Consequently, Midcal precludes t he use of this defense in privilege denial
cases except where state regulations explicitly mandate the privilege denial and a state
agency actively supervises privilege administration.
The second affirmative defense to Sherman Act jurisdiction, also derived from Parker
v. Brown, 177
 provides that federal antitrust jurisdiction does not exist where the chal-
lenged restraint is implemented by a state agency and can be characterized as a regulatory
act.'" In the Supreme Court's most recent decision involving this defense, Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,'" the Court held that this defense is available only if
the state has specifically "authorized or directed" a political subdivision to engage in
anticompetitive conduct.'" Moreover, there must be evidence that the "legislature corn-
templated the kind of activity complained of."'" Accordingly, under Community Communi-
cations, the "regulatory act" defense would he available in privilege denial cases only where
the defendant was a public hospital, and the enabling legislation establishing the hospital
specifically authorizes selective privilege administration.'" In addition, defendant hospi-
tal would need to establish that the legislature contemplated the privilege denial system
used by the hospital.'"
The third affirmative defense to Sherman Act jurisdiction, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine,'" is rooted in the first amendment's guarantee of the right to petition.'" The
'T° See, e.g., Mishier v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Systems, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,342 (10th
Cir. 1981); Williams v. Keaveland, 435 F. Sup)). 912, 918 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Barr v. National Right
to Life Comm., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,315 at 74,409 (M.D. Fla. 1981). But see Moles v.
Morton F. Plant Hosp., Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) II 63,600 at 77,189 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd 617 F.2d
293 (5th Cir. 1980).
171 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
172 Id. at 350-51. For the challenged restraint to be mandated by state regulation it must be
necessary for the effective implementation of the state regulatory scheme. Id.
I" 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
"4 Id. at 105.
176 Id.
"8 Id.
1 " 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
1 " Id. at 350-51.
"9 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
lb° Id. at 54-56 (adopting plurality approach in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Light and Power Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 413-17 (1978)).
181 Id.
' 62 Kissam, supra note 10, at 625.
' 93 Id.
184 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36
(1961); United Mine Workers of America, Inc. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1956).
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defense exempts from antitrust scrutiny genuine efforts by private parties to influence
executive, 186 legislative,'" and adjudicative's" government bodies.
There are two ways the Noerr-Pennington doctrine might be used by defendants in a
privilege denial case, First, members of the medical staff at a public hospital who allegedly
conspired to deny plaintiff staff privileges might claim that their privilege denial activity
was an attempt to influence a governmental agency, the public hospital board, to deny the
plaintiff staff privileges. The success of this defense will depend on whether the privilege
denial by the hospital board would have been exempt from antitrust scrutiny under
Parker v. Brown.'" Attempts to influence governmental action are exempt from antitrust
scrutiny only if the governmental action itself is exempt.'" Therefore, the privilege
denial would have to be considered a "regulatory act" under Parker v. Brown' in order
for the medical staff' activity leading to the privilege denial to be exempt under Noerr-
Pennington. Since the "regulatory act" defense would be extremely difficult to establish
in this context,' 92
 t his application of t he Noerr-Pennington doctrine is unlikely to be suc-
cessful.
The second way the Noerr-Pennington doctrine might be used in privilege denial cases
is suggested in a recent Fib h Circuit case, Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad. 193
The Mohammad Court held that disciplinary action taken by a medical staff is not pro-
tected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine where the state licensing board is permitted by the
statute to take action against the disciplined practitioner.'" The holding implies that if a
statute required the state licensing board to take action against disciplined practitioners,
the disciplinary action itself might be protected under Noerr-Pennington. ' 95 Thus, privi-
lege denials by both public and private hospitals might he exempt from the Sherman Ad
when a state statute requires the state licensing board to act against all practitioners who are
denied privileges.
If a defendant's Noerr-Pennington and Parker v. Brown defenses fail, and a plaintiff has
established the requisite connection with interstate commerce,'" Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion is established.'" Plaintiff then proceeds with proof of a Sherman Act violation.' 9 "
l " California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); Faschel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Governmental Action: The Bases and Limits of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cu,. L. REV. 80, 104-10 (1977).
'" United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1956).
' 97 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. [27, 135-36 (1961).
l" California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-13 (1972).
1 " 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See supra text accompanying notes 171-83.
1 " In re Airport Car Rental Litig., 474 F. Stipp. 1072, 1086 (1979), rev'd on other grounds on
reassignment, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,983 (N.D. Ca. 1981).
' 9 ' See supra text accompanying notes 171-83.
'" Id.
'" 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978). Mohammad involved an alleged conspiracy by members of a
hospital medical staff to coerce local practitioners not to associate with an outpatient abortion clinic.
Id. at 531-32.
19' Id. at 545.
1 " Id. No statute of this kind is currently in force in any state.
I" See supra text accompanying notes 187-95.
197 SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at § 233.
'" The elements of the plaintiff's case differ depending on whether the case is brought under
Section One or Section Two of the Act. Because this article concerns use of the Group Boycott Rule, a
method of proof available only under Section One, the primary focus of the discussion will be on
Section One. Before beginning this discussion, however, a brief examination of Section Two is
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Section One of the Sherman Act, read literally, proscribes every agreement which
restrains trade.'" This literal reading of the statute has been rejected by the Supreme
Court in favor of the "Rule of Reason."20° Under the "Rule of Reason," only unreasonable
worthwhile to understand the difference between the two sections and the reason Section One, and
the Group Boycott Rule, provide the optimal theory in most privilege denial challenges.
Section Two of the Sherman Act proscribes "monopolization" or "attempts to monopolize." 15
U,S.C. § 2 (1926). For text seesupra note 17. To prove "monopolization," the plaintiff must show "(1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power." United States v. Grunnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). To prove an
"attempt to monopolize," the plaintiff must show a specific intent to achieve (1) and (2). See Cooper,
Attempts at Monopolization.' A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72
Micit. L. REV. 373, 375 (1973). The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as the near-
complete lack of competing products which limit the defendant's ability to raise prices. United States
v. EA, dupont cleNemours & Co., 351 U.S. :377, 393 (1956); MILLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 91 (1980). Accordingly, a hospital has monopoly power if it offers a service that is
unavailable at other hospitals in the area. See, e.g., Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 878-79
(W.D. Pa., 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2726 (3d Cir. 1981). If the hospital with monopoly power has
purposefully acquired or maintained this power, the hospital has violated Section Two of the
Sherman Act. See Cooper, supra at 375.
The usefulness of Section Two of the Sherman Act in privilege-related cases is extremely limited
by the difficulty of proving a Section Two violation. While many hospitals have monopoly power over
particular services, it is difficult to prove that a particular privilege denial represents a purposeful
attempt by the hospital to acquire or maintain its monopoly power. Dolan & Ralston,supra note 5, at
766-67. if the unsuccessful privilege applicant proceeds under Section One of the Sherman Act
rather than Section Two, he need show only that the privilege denial in effect "restrains trade." See
infra text accompanying notes 199-219. Under Section One, neither the market power nor the
purpose of the hospital is at issue. Id. Thus the privilege applicant is far more likely to prevail under
Section One of the Sherman Act than under Section Two. There are, however, instances where
Section Two of the Sherman Act will provide a more promising theory of recovery. For example,
consider the case where a new ambulatory surgical center opens in a community previously served by
only one hospital. The hospital board, over the objection of the medical staff, denies staff privileges
to all practitioners who associate with the new surgical center. (Of course, in practice, hospital boards
rarely act on privilege issues without the approval of the medical staff. See supra text accompanying
notes 68-72.) By denying these practitioners privileges, the hospital forces the practitioners to choose
between association with the surgical center and staff privileges at the hospital. Because practitioners
generally need staff privileges at a hospital to survive professionally, and because there is only one
hospital in the area, the practitioners are forced to cease their association with the surgical center in
order to maintain their practices. The surgical center, no longer able to attract practitioners, is forced
out of business, and the hospital maintains its monopoly on surgical facilities. Clearly, the privilege
denials in this case represent purposeful attempts by the hospital to maintain its monopoly power. In
this instance, Section Two of the Sherman Act will.provide a more promising theory of recovery than
Section One. Section Two of the Sherman Act, unlike Section One, does not require the showing of a
"contract, combination ... or conspiracy" between severable actors. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) with
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), supra note 17. Because our hypothetical invoved unilateral activity by the
hospital board over the objection of the medical staff, proof of an agreement between the board and
the staff would be impossible. Therefore, Section Two of the Sherman Act, which does not require
proof' of an agreement, would be a more promising theory of recovery than Section One.
In practice, virtually all privilege denials involve cooperation between the hospital board and the
medical staff. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72. Consequently, the "agreement" requirement
of Section One of the Sherman Act can virtually always be met in privilege denial cases. If the
agreement requirement cats be met, the privilege applicant is far more likely to prevail under Section
One of the Sherman Act than under Section Two. Thus, in the vast majority of privilege litigation,
the plaintiff is more likely to succeed under Section One.
199 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). For text, see supra note 17.
200 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing Standard Oil of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
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restraints of trade are prohibited."' Plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged
restraint of trade is unreasonable to prevail under Section One of the Sherman Act.'" To
prove unreasonableness, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of
the challenged agreement outweigh the procompetitive effects.'" This showing of the
agreement's effects on competition in an entire industry can be extremely expensive for
the plaintiff and time-consuming for the courts.'" The Supreme Court has responded to
this problem by formulating the per se rules."'
The per se rules allow a plaintiff to avoid the difficult showing of anticompetitive
effects that is necessary under the "Rule of Reason."'" Instead of demonstrating the
anticompetitive effects of the challenged agreement, the plaintiff relies on a conclusive
presumption by the court that certain types of agreements are always anticompetitive.'"
If a plaintiff can demonstrate that the challenged agreement is of a type covered by the
per se rules,'" the agreement is presumed violative of Section One of the Sherman Act.'"
Once a plaintiff proves a per se violation, the defendant is precluded from offering
evidence that the restraint of trade posed by the challenged agreement is reasonable
under the circumstances.'"
III. THE GROUP BOYCOTT RULE
The group boycott rule is the per se rule which applies in situations where traders
collectively refuse to deal with another trader.'" This section will begin by examining the
Supreme Court cases in which the boycott rule was originally developed in an attempt to
ascertain the policies underlying the boycott rule. Next, the section will examine several
more recent Supreme Court cases which have further refined the boycott rule in order to
201 Id .
202 Id. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
2" National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92 (1978).
204 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982); Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
202 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 343-44 (1982).
266 Id.
207 Id .
"0 "Among the practices courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves
are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements." Id. at 344 n.15
(quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
206 Id. at 344-45.
210 Id.
Per se rules represent educated predictions by the court. Id. The court predicts, based on past
experience, that particular types of agreements will unreasonably restrain trade. Id. As with any
prediction, there is some margin of error. Id. Some agreements which are condemned under the per
se rules perhaps would have survived scrutiny under the"Rule of Reason." Id. The Court, however,
has determined as a policy matter that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify
the time and expense necessary to identify them. Id. at n.16 (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.5 (1977)). The prediction inherent in the per se approach is justified
because the approach promotes judicial efficiency and business certainty. Id. at 344. judicial efficiency is
promoted because courts avoid repeated "Rule of Reason" analyses of the most common trade
restraints. Id. at 351 (quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
Business certainty is promoted because certain types of trade restraints are known to be beyond
justification. Id. at 344. The judicial efficiency and business certainty promoted by the per se rules justify
the occasional invalidation of an agreement that would have survived scrutiny under the "Rule of
Reason." Id.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 212-94.
4 00	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 IV of. 25:383
determine the way the boycott rule would be applied today. Finally, several common types
of privilege denials will be discussed against. the background of the boycott cases in an
attempt to determine whether these types of privilege denials can he characterized as
group boycotts.
A. Development and Current Contours of the Offense
A group boycott is an agreement 212 between two or more industry participants, the
actors,2 " (1) involving a refusal by two or more competitors"' to deal with one or more
other industry participants. the targets?" and (2) made to coerce" or eliminate 217
 the
target industry participants. This type of agreement was first recognized as aper se offense
in Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission. 2 " In Fashion Originators, the Court
held that such an arrangement is so clearly anticompetitive that it is proper to exclude
evidence of reasonableness."' The case involved an organization of original clothes
manufacturers who combined to eliminate manufacturers of copied clothing, "style pi-
rates," from the clothing industry. 22° In order to eliminate the "pirates," the Fashion
Originators Guild agreed to stop selling their clothing to retailers who also bought from
the "pirates." 221 Since most clothing manufacturers were members of the Fashion
Originators Guild,222 most retailers were forced to stop dealing with the pirates in order
to obtain merchandise and stay in business. The "pirates," unable to find retail outlets
willing to deal with them, were forced out of business, 223
The Court viewed the Fashion Originators Guild as essentially an "extra-
governmental agency"224 attempting to regulate interstate commerce, precisely the type
of private restraint of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act. 225 Such a conspiracy could
not be justified even if' the Guild's goal was legitimate, since the regulation of interstate
commerce is the province of the legislature and not private industry. 2 " Accordingly, the
Court held that the conspiracy was illegal per se.'"
The boycott agreement held illegal per se in Fashion Originators was between direct
512 All section one offenses require proof of an agreement. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
213
 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 461 (1941).
An industry participant is anyone engaged in the particular industry under consideration.
2 " Competitors are industry participants at the same level of production (e.g. retailers, man-
ufacturers). The requirement that at least two competitors refuse to deal is basic to the concept of a
group (rather than a unilateral) boycott. If only one party were refusing to deal, the agreement
would be simple exclusive contract. Such a contract, although it may violate the Sherman Act, is not a
group boycott. See Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. at 465.
212 Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. at 465-66.
210 See, e.g., Kieffer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph F. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
2 " See, e.g., Fashion Originators', 312 U.S. 457, 461 (1941).
2 " 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
212
 Id. at 468.
2" Id. at 461.
221 Id .
2" Id. at 462.
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224 Id. at 465-66 (quoting Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242
(1899)).
225 Id .
2" Id. at 468.
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competitors. 228 In Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,'" however, the Supreme Court held
that parties to a boycott agreement need not be in competition. 230 The boycott agreement
in Klors was between a retailer and manufacturers. 231 In exchange for the loyalty of the
retailer, the manufacturers agreed to boycott the retailer's competitor. 232 The Court
found this boycott agreement indistinguishable in purpose and effect from the one in
Fashion Originators.' Accordingly, the Court held that the agreement was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.234
The boycott agreements held per se illegal in both Fashion Originators and Klors were
designed to force competitors out of business. 235 In Kieffer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, 236 the Court further extended the group boycott rule by holding that boycott
agreements designed to coerce competitors into changing their trade practices were also
per se violations of the Sherman Act. 237 In Kieffer-Stewart, liquor manufacturers agreed to
boycott wholesalers who sold liquor above list price. 238 The boycott was not intended to
force the wholesalers out of business.239 Rather, the manufacturers hoped to coerce the
wholesalers into lowering their prices. 240 The Court reasoned that such coercion of
competitors is no less a restraint on free trade than the elimination of competitors."'
Moreover, the boycott agreement in Kieffer-Stewart in effect eliminated competitors who
refused to be coerced. 242 The Court held, therefore, the Kieffer-Stewart coercion boycott
was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 243
Two more recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the current contours of the boycott
offense. in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 244 the Court held that a statutorily imposed
duty of self-regulation will not immunize an industry from the boycott rule. 245 In United
States v. General Motors, inc.., 245 the Court held that a group boycott need not involve an
explicit agreement provided there is a pattern of concerted action calculated to coerce or
eliminate competitors.247
Silver involved a New York Stock Exchange regulation prohibiting direct phone
connections between members and non-members of the Exchange. 248 Before the regula-
tion was adopted, the plaintiff, a non-member broker, relied on a direct phone connec-
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quotations, the plaintiff could not compete effectively as a broker. 25 ° The day the Ex-
change regulation went inio effect, the plaintiff's direct phone connection was terminated
without warning, 251 eventually forcing the plaintiff out of business.'"
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff alleged that the Exchange regulation
was a boycott agreement between Exchange members designed to eliminate non-member
brokers from the brokerage industry. 253 The Stock Exchange claimed that the regulation
was intended to protect securities consumers from financially irresponsible brokers. 254
The regulation protected consumers by effectively forcing them to buy their securities
through Exchange members whose financial responsibility was assured by the rigorous
requirements for Exchange membership. 255 Moreover, the Exchange claimed, the power
and duty to protect consumers from financially irresponsible brokers was statutorily
imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 256 Since the regulation was adopted
pursuant to a statutorily imposed duty of industry control, the Exchange claimed, the
regulation was exempt from the boycott rule. 257
The Court rejected the Exchange's arguments and held that the Exchange regulation
clearly was a boycott agreement between Exchange members designed to eliminate
non-member competitors. 256 The Court stated that since the decision in Fashion
Originators, such boycott agreements have been held per se illegal regardless of the parties'
motivation. 25° Consequently, the Court noted, even if the Exchange enacted the regula-
tion in order to protect consumers, the fact that the regulation took the form of a group
boycott made the regulation illegal per se. 56° Moreover, the Court stated, the fact that the
Exchange regulation was enacted pursuant to a statutorily imposed duty to police the
brokerage industry did not immunize the regulation from the Boycott Rule. 261 Statutorily
imposed duties cannot be accomplished by impermissible means. 262 To hold that the
Exchange regulation was not illegal would be tantamount to repealing the Sherman Act
by implication, and repeals by implication violate "a cardinal principle of (statutory)
construction ."263 Therefore, the Court held, the Exchange regulation violates the Sher-
man Act regardless of whether it was intended to fulfill a statutorily imposed duty of
industry regulation."' Since boycott agreements are per se illegal, the motivation underly-
ing the Exchange regulation is irrelevant. 285
The Silver Court repeatedly stressed the fact that the plaintiff's direct phone connec-
tion with a member broker was discontinued without notice or an opportunity to be
heard.26° The Court indicated in dicta that if the Exchange regulation had afforded
256
	 at 347.
"' Id. at 344.
2" Id. at 345.
253 Id.
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adequate procedural safeguards for affected brokers, then the regulation might have
been considered a legitimate exercise of industry self-regulation rather than a boycott
agreement."' The presence of procedural safeguards in a regulatory scheme lends
credence to its legitimacy and insures fairness in its administration. 2 " Moreover, the
Court observed, "the affording of procedural safeguards ... will substantively encourage
the lessening of anticompetitive behavior (and) allow the antitrust court to perform its
function effectively."'" Thus, the Silver Court left open the question of whether a
"boycott-type" regulation would be permissible if it incorporated procedural safe-
guards." This question remains unanswered today.
The issue resolved in Silver was the significance of the motivation underlying the
boycott agreement. The significance of the agreement itself was not addressed by the
Court until three years later in United States v. General Motors."' In General Motors, the
Court held that a boycott agreement could be implied by the parties' behavior even
without evidence of an explicit agreement. 272 The case involved competition between
authorized and non-authorized Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area. 273 The non-
authorized dealers, or "discounters," purchased cars in bulk from several authorized
dealers and then resold the cars to consumers.274 The authorized dealers who were not
selling cars to the discounters complained to General Motors.'" The manufacturer,
fearing the loss of several of its best dealers, and hoping to maintain the integrity of its
authorized sales and service network, enacted a regulation forbidding its authorized
dealers from selling to the discounters.'" The regulation was not issued pursuant to any
explicit agreement between General Motors and the complaining dealers."' Moreover,
while it was understood by both parties that the dealers would police themselves to insure
compliance with the regulation, 2 " no explicit agreement was reached between General
Motors and the dealers concerning enforcement.. 2" Nevertheless, the dealers enforced
the regulation and forced the discounters out of business. 2 "
On appeal, plaintiff alleged that the enactment by General Motors of the regulation,
and the subsequent enforcement of the regulation by the dealers, implied that General
Motors and the dealers were parties to a boycott agreement."' Respondents, on the other
hand, attempted to characterize their steps against the discounters as independent "paral-
lel" actions rather than concerted ones. 282 The Court rejected respondents' argument,
finding "a fabric interwoven by many strands of joint action" 2" which compels the
conclusion that a boycott agreement in fact existed. 2 " Lack clan explicit agreement, the
267 Id. at 360.
269 Id. at 360-63.
269 Id. at 363.
279 Id. at 366.
' 7 ' 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
272 Id. at 142.
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Court stated, would not immunize such a conspiracy from antitrust scrutiny." There-
fore, the Court held, the General Motors regulation and its enforcement by the dealers
constitute an implied boycott agreement which is illegal per se. 2"
Fashion Originators, Klors, Kieffer-Stewart, Silver, and General Motors, taken together,
delineate the contours of the Group Boycott offense. A plaintiff must first prove an
agreement between two or more industry participants."' The agreement need not be
explicit, 298 and the parties need not be in competition with each other. 299 The agreement
must involve a boycott by at least two competitors against another "target" industry
participant.29 ° The boycott may be designed either to eliminate the target from the
industry"' or to coerce the target into changing its trade practices.292 A boycott agree-
ment that meets the above requirements cannot be justified. 293 As a result, the motivation
underlying such a boycott agreement, even it it is consumer protection, becomes irrele-
vant."'
B. Privilege Denials as Group Boycotts
The previous section examined the leading Group Boycott precedent to ascertain the
development and current contours of the group boycott offense. The purpose of this
section is to determine, in light of the boycott precedent discussed in the previous section,
which, if arty, privilege denials constitute group boycotts.
A threshold problem in applying the boycott precedent to privilege denials is that
most of the boycott cases have involved retailers and manufacturers."' At first glance, the
trading relationship between retailers and manufacturers seems different from the rela-
tionship between practitioners and hospitals, necessitating a different restraint-of-trade
analysis. Unlike retailer and manufacturer, practitioner and hospital do not stand in the
relationship of buyer and seller. Consequently, a "refusal to deal" between a practitioner
and a hospital might have different purposes and effects than a "refusal to deal" between
a retailer and a manufacturer. if "refusals to deal" in the retailer-manufacturer context
had different purposes and effects than "refusals to deal" in the practitioner-hospital
context, boycott precedent from the retailer-manufacturer context would not be useful in
analyzing alleged boycotts in the practitioner-hospital context.
On closer scrutiny, however, the trading relationship between retailers and manufac-
turers seems essentially the same as the trading relationship between practitioners and
hospitals. in each case, one party provides an essential element in the business of the
2"5 Id. at 142.
2 "" Id. at 145.
297
	 Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 460
(1941).
2" United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 142 (1966).
299
 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359, 207, 210 (1959).
299 See supra note 214.
29`
	 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457,
461 (1941).
292 See, e.g., Kieffer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 212 (1951).
2" Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 468
(1941).
294
	 v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963).
293
 The single exception is Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), which
involved the exchange and its member brokers. See supra text accompanying notes 250-76.
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other. The retailer, for example, provides the manufacturer with a means of selling his
goods; in exchange, the manufacturer provides the retailer with goods to sell. Similarly,
the hospital provides the practitioner with hospital facilities; in exchange, the practitioner
provides the hospital with paying patients. Practitioners and hospitals, like retailers and
manufacturers, are indispensable elements in the delivery of certain products and ser-
vices to consumers.
Boycott agreements, by restraining free competition within this delivery system,
prevent consumers from receiving the best possible products and services at the lowest
prices."" A boycott agreement has this effect whether it involves practitioners and
hospitals,2 " 7 or retailers and manufacturers. In either case, the industry participant who is
the victim of the boycott loses his ability to compete on equal footing with other industry
participants."" When the ability of an industry participant to compete freely is restrained,
the broad aim of the Sherman Act — to insure free cotnpetition 2 " — is frustrated
regardless of the industrial context in which the competitive restraint occurs. Thus, when
viewed in light of the broad aim of the Sherman Act, boycott precedent involving retailers
and manufacturers should control similar cases involving practitioners and hospitals.
The following subsections discuss four common types of privilege denials in an
attempt to discover which, if any, constitute group boycotts. Each subsection begins with
an analysis of the privilege denial in terms of the Supreme Court group boycott prece-
dent, and concludes with a discussion of lower court cases which might prove useful in a
challenge to that type of privilege denial.
1. Class-based Privilege Denials
Many hospitals have regulations or by-laws which prohibit the granting of privileges
to whole classes of practitioners such as osteopaths, podiatrists, chiropractors, and psy-
chologists."' Pursuant to these regulations, applicants in these classes are denied privi-
leges automatically regardless of individual merit. 30 ' When called upon to justify this type
of regulations, hospitals generally claim that true standards applied to the training of
practitioners in these disciplines are not as rigorous as those applied to the training of
medical doctors, and, as a result, it would be necessary for the hospital to assess the ability
of these practitioners on an individual basis. 302 Since such an evaluation is difficult and
time-consuming, hospitals argue, regulations excluding these classes of practitioners are
justified . 3°3
Cases involving class-exclusion regulations should be controlled by Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange. 304 In Silver, the Supreme Court held that consumer protection cannot be
accomplished by means of a regulation which amounts to a group boycott."' Silver
2 ° 6 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941).
2" See supra text accompanying notes 127 -43.
296 See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1963); supra text
accompanying notes 75-90.
231b Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941).
300
 See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
301 Id.
302 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 729.
203
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3°' Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. at 365.
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involved an Exchange regulation effectively excluding non-member brokers from use of
Exchange facilities. 306 The Exchange claimed that the regulation was necessary to protect
consumers from financially incompetent brokers.307 The duly to protect consumers, the
Exchange asserted, was part of a statutorily imposed duty of self-regulation unique to the
securities trading industry. 3" In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that a
regulation in the form of a group boycott is so clearly anticompetitive that it could not
withstand scrutiny even if the regulation were actually adopted to benefit consumers. 309
Courts should strike down class-exclusion regulations at hospitals on similar
grounds. Although hospitals may have a duty to protect consumers from incompetent
practitioners, 51 ° this duty cannot be fulfilled by adopting a regulation which amounts to a
group boycott. Such regulations do not incorporate procedural safeguards to insure that.
only industry participants who truly present a danger to consumers are excluded. 3 "
Moreover, the Sherman Act prohibits group boycotts regardless of their underlying
motivation. 312 Therefore, hospital regulations which in effect boycott classes of prac-
titioners are impermissible even if the regulations are genuinely intended to protect
hospital patients.
Courts may not find Silver, which involved stock exchange regulations, controlling in
cases involving hospital regulations for two reasons. First, the hospital board, unlike the
administrative board of the Stock Exchange, does not stand to benefit competitively by the
challenged regulation. Members of the hospital board in no sense compete for business
with the practitioners who are denied privileges. Consequently, the hospital regulation
could not be designed to coerce or eliminate competition. The Silver regulation, on the
other hand, was enacted by stock brokers who competed for business directly with the
non-member brokers that the regulation elirninated. 3 "
The view that Silver should not apply to hospital privilege regulations because
members of the hospital boards, unlike members of the administrative hoard of the Stock
Exchange, do not compete directly with those affected by the regulations, is plausible.
Courts should, however, reject this view because it rests on the false premise that the
hospital board acts unilaterally when it adopts the challenged regulation. Regulations of
this type are enacted on the recommendation of the hospital's medical staff. 314
 Members
of the medical staff, like members of the Stock Exchange, benefit directly from such a
regulation. 315
 Moreover, the hospital board has strong incentives to cooperate with the
medical staff when the latter group insists on the enactment of a class-exclusion regula-
tion." 6 Accordingly, such a regulation should be viewed as a boycott agreement between
the hospital board and medical staff designed to eliminate a class of the medical staff's
competitors. Viewed in this light, the hospital regulation falls squarely under Silver.
Another reason courts may not find Silver controlling in cases involving hospital
"6 Id. at 353-55.
307
308
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privilege regulation is that from a public policy standpoint, the duty to protect consumers
from incompetent medical practitioners may be considered more important than the duty
to protect consumers from financially insecure stock brokers. Even if this were true,
however, it does not lead to the conclusion that a group boycott is permissible for the
hospital even though it was impermissible for the Stock Exchange in Silver. The boycott is
an impermissible method of industry self-regulation because it is not tailored to eliminate
only the competitors who actually endanger consumers.3 t 7 Accordingly, boycotts are
impermissible regardless of the magnitude of the potential danger the boycott is designed
to avoid. Under Silver, the only possibility that a boycott-type regulation might survive
Sherman Act scrutiny is where procedural safeguards were incorporated to insure that
only competitors which present a danger to consumers, such as incompetent medical
practitioners, were eliminated. 3 ' 8
There is a paucity of case law involving Sherman Act challenges to class-based
privilege denials. In Weiss v. York Hospital, 319 the District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania denied the defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment against an
osteopath alleging a class-based denia1. 32 ° Although the court did not discuss Silver, and
reserved the question of whether the "Rule of Reason" or the per se rules would apply, 32 '
the court seemed to assume that the arrangement alleged by plaintiff, if proven, would
amount to a group boycott. 322
Another case, Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 323 although it did
not involve a staff privilege denial, is illustrative of the kind of reasoning which might be
used by courts in applying the Group Boycott Rule to class-based privilege denials. In Blue
Shield, the Fourth Circuit held that defendant insurer's refusal to reimburse policy-
holders for services provided by psychologists violated the Sherman Act.324 The chal-
lenged insurance plans provided reimbursement for psychologist services only when
those services were administered under the supervision of a physician. 325 The court
found that administration of the insurance plan was controlled by physicians and psychia-
trists.326 The provision in the plan which excluded psychologist services from coverage
was in fact an agreement by members of the controlling group designed to eliminate
competition from the psychologists. 327 Accordingly, the court held that the insurance
plan violated the Sherman Act. 328
Although Blue Shield did not involve staff privileges, it provides useful precedent for
cases involving class-based privilege denials. The exclusion of psychologists from the Blue
Shield plan put psychologists, as a class, at a competitive disadvantage in attracting
patients when compared with other classes of practitioners who were covered by the Blue
3'7
	 v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963).
3 " Id. at 364.
3'9
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Shield plan. Similarly, the exclusion of a class of practitioners from access to hospital
facilities forces the excluded practitioners into a similar competitive disadvantage. 326
 In
addition, the administration of the Blue Shield plan, like the administration of staff
privileges, is based on recommendations from an advisory board made up of practitio-
ners. The recommendation by such an advisory board of a rule which places an entire
class of the hoard's competitors at a disadvantage should be scrutinized carefully by
antitrust courts. The Blue Shield court's willingness to find a violation in this situation may
influence future court decisions involving class-based privilege denials.
2. Contract-based Privilege Denials
A hospital will often contractually grant a practitioner or group of practitioners the
exclusive right to practice their specialty at the hospita1. 3 " By offering exclusive contracts,
the hospital is able to attract well-known practitioners to the medical staff, and insure the
loyalty of practitioners on the staff who are threatening to leave the hospita1. 33 ' Exclusive
contracts can take many forms. The contract may be expressed in a writing signed by both
parties.332
 More commonly, however, the hospital board will adopt a by-law which re-
stricts the granting of new privileges in a given specialty to practitioners who join the
existing practice group.333
 In other instances, hospitals grant de facto exclusive privileges
by allowing decisions concerning all privilege applicants in a given specialty to be made
entirely on the recommendation of a staff practitioner group in that specialty. 334
 This
arrangement allows the staff' practitioner group to rest rict the granting of privileges to
applicants who join their practice group, thereby effectively maintaining an exclusive
contract.
Cases involving contract-based privilege denials should be controlled by Klor's v.
Broadway-Hale Stores.' In Klor's, the Supreme Court held that parties to a boycott
agreement need not be on the same level of production. 336 Klor's involved a large
appliance dealer who used his market power to force many of the local appliance
distributors to refuse to supply a competing dealer. 337
 As a result of the boycott, the
competing dealer had difficulty obtaining merchandise. 333
 At trial, the defendant
329 See supra text accompanying notes 75-90.
33° See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
3" See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
332 See, e.g., Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir.
1982).
"a Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery System, 9 Cum. L. REV.
684, 700 - 02 (1979).
33' See, e.g., Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 851-52, 860-62 (W.D. Pa. 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 81-2726 (3d Cir. 1981).
335 359 U.S. 207 (1959). But see Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, U.S. 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983). In Hyde, plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, challenged
a hospital's exclusive contract with an anesthesiology group as a per se illegal "tying arrangement"
rather than a group boycott. Id. at 289. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product, but only on the condition that the buyer purchase a different (or tied) product."Id. (quoting.
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). The Fifth Circuit, reversing the court
below, found that the effect of the exclusive contract was in fact to tie the purchase of the contract
group's anesthesiology services to the purchase of the defendant hospital's services, Id. at 289- 90, and
that such an arrangement was a per se violation. Id. at 293-94.
328 Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 214 (1959).
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appliance dealer asserted that because there was no single agreement between the dis-
tributors, only separate agreements between each distributor and the defendant
appliance dealer, there was no collective refusal to dea1. 339 In rejecting this argument, the
Court reasoned that the challenged restraint of trade in Klor's was indistinguishable in
purpose and effect from group boycotts involving a single agreement between industry
participants on the same level of production. 3" Accordingly, the Court held, a series of
separate boycott agreements between industry participants at different levels of produc-
tion, such as the arrangement in Klor's, constituted a group boycott.. 3 "
Courts should strike down contract-based privilege denials on similar grounds. Con-
tract-based privilege denials are similar in purpose and effect to the boycott held illegal in
ti/o6. In Klor's, a retailer used its market power to induce suppliers to boycott the
retailer's competitor."' As a result of the boycott, the competitor had difficulty obtaining
merchandise and was put at a competitive disadvantage."'" Similarly, in the case of a
contract-based privilege denial, a practitioner or practitioner group uses its market
power, its ability to attract patients to the hospital, to induce the hospital board and
medical staff to boycott a competing practitioner."' Since staff privileges would provide
the applicant-practitioner a vital source of new patient s, 3 " the practitioner, like the target.
competitor in /Oar's, is put at a competitive disadvantage." 4" Since a contract-based
privilege denial is indistinguishable in purpose and effect from the boycott in Klor's,
courts should hold these denials to he group boycotts.
Courts may not find Klor's, which involved a concerted refusal to deal by several
appliance manufacturers, controlling in cases involving contract-based privilege denials.
A contract-based privilege denial involves only a unilateral refusal to deal by a single
hospital. A unilateral refusal to deal is not a group boycott. 3 " Since it is based on an
agreement between the hospital board and a single practice group, rather than between
the hospital board and the entire medical staff, the alleged boycott agreement involves
only unilateral action by the hospital board, rather than joint action by competing
practitioners on the medical staff. Accordingly, based on this reasoning, some courts
might find that the group boycott theory which applied in Klor's is inapplicable here.
The view that Klor's should not apply to contract-based privilege denials because
these denials, unlike the boycott in Klor's, involve only unilateral refusals to deal, is
plausible. Courts should, however, reject this view because it ignores the inevitable role
played by the hospital medical staff in all privilege decisions. 34 " Hospital by-laws virtually
never permit the hospital board to act unilaterally on privilege matters."' Conflicts
between the hospital board and medical staff concerning privilege administration gener-
ally are resolved by a joint hoard-staff comminee. 3 " Thus, all privilege related decisions,
including the establishment of exclusive contracts, are approved, at least implicitly, by the
338 Id .
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medical staff. When the medical staff approves these contracts, they are in effect agree-
ing to boycott collectively certain privilege applicants."' Thus, a contract-based privilege
denial entails a collective boycott by staff practitioners of a competing practitioner. Such a
boycott falls squarely under Klor's.
The applicability of Klor's to contract-based privilege denials should not be limited to
cases where the plaintiff produces evidence of an explicit exclusivity agreement or
hospital by-law. Under United States v. General Motors Corporation,352 proof of an explicit
boycott agreement is unnecessary where a plaintiff can prove a pattern of joint action
which implies a boycott agreement. 353 Accordingly, a plaintiff will be able to establish the
existence of a Klor's-type boycott merely by showing a pattern of repeated privilege
denials to all applicants in a given specialty. Such a pattern would imply the existence of a
de facto exclusive contract which is no less a group boycott than a similar explicit agree-
ment.354
Until recently, plaintiffs challenging contract-based privilege denials uniformly ig-
nored the boycott theory.355 This trend should change following the recent district court
decision in Robinson v. McGovern.'" Although the Robinson court held that plaintiff failed
to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of a de facto exclusive privilege
contract, 357 the court expressed a willingness to treat such a contract as a group boycott if
the existence of the contract were established. 358 Robinson involved the denial of staff
privileges to a cardiothoracic surgeon. 359 The surgeon alleged that the hospital board and
medical staff granted a practice group in cardiothoracic surgery de facto exclusive privi-
leges by allowing the head of the group to control privilege administration to all car-
diothoracic surgeon privilege applicants."° The plaintiff's case failed because he could
not establish a pattern of repeated privilege denials to all cardiothoracic surgeon appli-
cants."' In fact, the majority of these applicants had been granted staff privileges. 362
Nevertheless, the willingness of the court to entertain the plaintiff's de facto contract
theory should be useful in future contract-based privilege denial cases.
3. Retaliatory Privilege Denials
Privilege applicants are sometimes denied staff privileges because they engage in an
activity that members of the hospital medical staff wish to curtail. 363 For example,
33 ' The medical staff is agreeing to deny privileges to all applicants in the specialty that is subject
to the exclusive contract.
332
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privilege case, suggests that a tying arrangement theory is a strong alternative to a boycott theory in
his factual situation. The ultimate viability of the tying theory will depend on the outcome of the
Supreme Court review.
333
 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), appeal docketed, No 81-2726 (3d Cir. 1981).
357
 Id. at 907.
Id. at 904-07.
350
 Id. at 848.
360
 Id. at 904-07.
361 Id. at 912-13.
361 Id .
363 See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
March 1984]
	
GROUP BOYCOTT RULE	 411
practitioners who associate with a health maintenance organization 364 or an outpatient
abortion clinic366
 are sometimes denied privileges merely because the medical staff disap-
proves of those organizations. By denying the applicant privileges, the medical staff hopes
to coerce the applicant to discontinue his association with the disapproved organiza-
tion.366
 In addition, the medical staff hopes to deter other practitioners from becoming
involved with these organizations."' The ultimate goal of such a policy is to make it
impossible for the disapproved organization to attract needed practitioners, and thereby
force the organization to cease operations. 368
To prove that a privilege denial is retaliatory, a plaintiff might establish a pattern of
previous denials to all privilege applicants who associated with the disapproved organiza-
tion. Alternatively, a plaintiff might establish that his qualifications met or exceeded the
standards used to evaluate other applicants, and that all other applicants with the plain-
tiff's credentials who were not associated with the disapproved organization were granted
privileges. In some cases, the medical staff might admit that the privilege denial was
retaliatory, but claim that the action was justified to eliminate a substandard health care
institution. 3 69
Once a plaintiff has established that the privilege denial was retaliatory, United States
v. General Motors 370 should control. In General Motors, the Supreme Court held that a
boycott agreement could be implied by the parties' behavior even absent evidence of an
explicit agreement."' The case involved an attempt by several authorized Chevrolet
dealers, in combination with General Motors, to eliminate non-authorized dealers. 372 On
the insistence of the complaining dealers, General Motors notified all authorized dealers
that they would lose their authorization if they continued to sell cars to unauthorized
dealers."3 The authorized dealers policed themselves to insure compliance with the
regulation. 374 The defendants asserted that since there was no evidence of an explicit
boycott agreement either between the complaining dealers and General Motors, or
among the dealers themselves, there was no concerted refusal to dea1. 378 Rejecting this
argument, the Court reasoned that. independent, "parallel" refusals to deal were essen-
tially similar to a concerted refusal to deal and amounted to grOup boycott. 376
The boycott found illegal in General Motors is structurally analogous to a retaliatory
privilege denial. In General Motors, certain authorized dealers, in combination with Gen-
eral Motors, threatened to revoke the authorization of all authorized dealers who partici-
pated in the disapproved practice. 377 Similarly, in the case of retaliatory privilege denials,
364 See supra note 155.
a" See, e.g., Barr v. National Right to Life Comm., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)1164,315 (M.D. Fla.
1981).
366 Id. at 74,407.
al" Id.
363 See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 535-38 (1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
36° See, e.g., Barr v. National Right to Life Comm., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,315 at 74,410
(M.D. Fla. 1981).
37° 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 271-86.
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377 Id. at 133-39.
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certain authorized hospital users, in combination with the hospital, deny authorization to
practitioners who participate in the disapproved practice.'" Moreover, the purpose of
the boycott in General Motors is identical to the purpose of a retaliatory privilege denial —
to eliminate the disapproved practice.3" An essentially similar structure and purpose
should make retaliatory privilege denials group boycotts under General Motors.
Courts may not find General Motors controlling in cases involving retaliatory privilege
denials because the actors in General Motors, the authorized dealers, competed for business
directly with the targets of the boycott, the unauthorized dealers."" The boycott in General
Motors, therefore, clearly was designed to eliminate competition."' With retaliatory privi-
lege denials, however, the actors, members of the medical staff', do not compete for
business directly with the targets of th>.: boycott, the disapproved health care organiza-
tions. Rather, members of the medical staff compete for business with the practitimiers at the
disapproved organizations, not the organizations themselves. If the alleged boycott is
successful, the organizations will cease to exist. The practitioners formerly associated with
the organizations, however, will continue to compete for business directly with members
of the medical staff. The retaliatory privilege denial, therefore, unlike the boycott in
General Motors, is not designed to eliminate competition.
The view that General Motors should not apply to retaliatory privilege denials because
these denials, unlike the boycott in General Motors, are not designed to eliminate direct
competitors, is plausible. Courts should, however, reject this view because although the
boycott in that case was in fact designed to eliminate competition, this element is not
necessary to the boycott offense. Under Kieffer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 382
boycotts designed to coerce competitors into changing their trade practices are no more
permissible than boycotts designed to eliminate competitors. 383 Retaliatory privilege de-
nials are, in fact, efforts by members of the medical staff to coerce competing practitio-
ners to stop offering certain disapproved services to patients."' Members of the medical
staff accomplish this end by eliminating the organizations through which the practitioners
offer the disapproved services. Thus, for example, the medical staff may seek to eliminate
a health maintenance organization in order to coerce practitioners to offer their services
only on a fee-for-service basis. Similarly, the medical staff may seek to eliminate outpa-
tient abortion clinics to coerce practitioners to offer abortion services only in the tradi-
tional hospital setting. Since "coercion boycotts" are no more permissible than "elimina-
tion boycotts,"385 retaliatory privilege denials fall within the contours of the boycott
offense developed in General Motors and Kieffer-Stewart.
There are no cases involving retaliatory privilege denials in which the plaintiff has
asserted the Group Boycott theory. Nevertheless, a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Moharnmad, 3" may open the door for future application of the
boycott theory to retaliatory privilege denials. In Mohammad, an outpatient abortion clinic
asserted that members of the obstetrics-gynecology staff, or "OB-GYN" staff, at the local
3Z8 See supra text accompanying notes 363-68.
333 Compare supra text accompanying notes 363-68 with supra text accompanying notes 271-86.
388
	 States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 133-39 (1966).
38l Id .




384 See .supra text accompanying notes 363-68.
383 Kieffer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
388 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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hospital had conspired to force the clinic to cease operations. 387 The clinic introduced
evidence that members of the OB-GYN staff harassed every physician who became
involved with the clinic. 388 The harassment was intended to coerce, and did coerce, all
physicians associated with the clinic to discontinue their involvement. 388 The district
court, after concluding that plaintiff's allegations, if true, would suffice to establish a
group boycott,"" granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, which exempts from antitrust scrutiny genuine efforts by private
parties to influence government bodies."' The court of appeals reversed, 382 holding that
the district court improperly applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.393 The case was then
remanded for a full trail concerning the plaintiff's boycott claims. 384 Significantly, the
court of appeals noted that per se treatment Of the case would be proper if the plaintiff's
allegations of intimidation and coercion by the OB-GYN staff were substantiated. 385
If a practitioner involved with the Feminist Women's Health Center had applied for
staff privileges, the alleged coercion boycott in Mohammad might well have involved a
retaliatory privilege denial. The fact that no privilege denial occurred should not detract
from the applicability of the Mohammad court's holding to coercion boycott cases which do
involve retaliatory denials.
4. Merit-based Denials
All privilege denials involve a concerted refusal to deal with the applicant practitioner
by members of the medical staff. 39° Accordingly, the assumption underlying the boycott
theory, that concerted refusals to deal are rarely justillable, 387 supports the application of
the boycott theory to all privilege denials. Nevertheless, there is no boycott case precedent
which supports the application of the theory to privilege denials which are genuinely
merit-based. 388 Moreover, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,' the Supreme Court
indicated a willingness to except from the boycott rule legitimate instances of industry
self-regulation, provided the regulation was administered fairly and incorporated pro-
cedural safeguards. 40° A genuine merit-based privilege denial in which the applicant was
afforded procedural due process might well pass muster under Silver.
387 Id. at 535-38.
388 Id.
389 Id.
396 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (N.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
39 ' Id. at 1268. See supra text accompanying notes 184-95.
392
	
F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
"3 Id. at 542.
394 Id. at 457.
395 Id.
396 See supra text accompanying notes 66 - 72.
397 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457, 468
(1941).
398 For examples of cases denying the boycott theory in this situation, see Moles v. Morton F.
Plant Hosp., 617 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S 919 (1980); Everhart v. Jane
Stormont Hosp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,703 (D. Kan. 1982).
3" 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
4.0 Id. at 359-66. The Court suggested some sort of internal administrative review of regulatory
decisions, if sufficiently stringent to insure fairness to those affected by the regulation, might be a
sufficient procedural safeguard. Id.
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Lower courts uniformly have upheld privilege denials when the applicant prac-
titioner fails to demonstrate that the denial was not merit-based. 401 Given the weight of
these decisions, and the Supreme Court's dicta in Silver, the boycott theory is unlikely to
be useful to victims of genuine merit-based denials.
In summary, courts should find the leading boycott precedent applicable to class-
based, contract-based, and retaliatory privilege denials. Accordingly, courts should apply
the Group Boycott Rule to cases involving these types of privilege denials. Strictly
speaking, courts should also apply the rule to merit-based denials. This application of the
Rule is unlikely, however, since it contravenes the great weight of current authority.
1V. PER SE ILLEGALITY Or PRIVILEGE DENIALS INVOLVING GROUP BOYCOTTS
The preceding sections examined various types of privilege denials to determine
which denials constituted group boycotts. This section focuses on the procedural effect of
a finding that a particular privilege denial is a group boycott. The central question in this
section is whether privilege denials which constitute group boycotts are per se violations of
the Sherman Act. Clearly, boycotts which occur in non-professional industries are per se
violations.402 Thus, a finding that a particular activity in a non-professional industry is a
group boycott raises a conclusive presumption that the activity violates the Sherman
Act.403
 Within the professions, however, there has been considerable controversy over the
procedural effect of a group boycott finding. 904 In particular, courts have differed over
whether per se rules apply to the professions, or whether all professional activities should
be accorded a full "Rule of Reason" analysis. 405
Uncertainty over the applicability of per se rules to the professions has resulted in a
tendency by lower courts to accord all staff privilege denials a full "Rule of Reason"
analysis, even where the denials amounted to group boycotts. 406 The roots of this ten-
dency lie in two Supreme Court cases in which price fixing by the professions was not
explicitly treated as a per se offense."' It is the absence of per se language in these cases
that has led most courts and commentators to conclude that the professions are exempt
from the per se rules. 403
40 ' See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
402
 See supra text accompanying notes 219-94.
403
 See supra text accompanying notes 206-207 and note 207.
404 See,	 Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977) (professions exempt from per se rules); Viezaga v. National Board for Respira-
tory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Gas. (CCH) 1 61,274 (N.D. III. 1977) (suggestion that per se rules apply
only to commercial activity of professionals); Bauer, Professional Activities and Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 570, 584-92 (1975) (professions exempt from per se rules); Liebenheft & Pollard, Antitrust
Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a Frameworkfor Assessing Private Restraints , 34 VANE). L. REV.
927 (1981) (per se violations by professions should be only presumptively illegal to allow procompeti-
tive self-regulation if there is no less restrictive alternative); Note, Antitrust and Non-Profit Entities, 94
HARV. L. REv. 802 (1981) (special test for professions which would permit anticompetitive acts that
are intended to correct for market failures); Note, The Professions and Non -Commercial Purposes, 11 U.
Micn. J.L. REF. 387 (1978) (professions exempt from per se rules).
4"
 See, e.g., Everhart v. Jane Stormont Medical Soc'y, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67,703 at
73,897 (D. Kan. 1982) and cases cited therein (per se rules do not apply to the professions); but see
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 547 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 924 (1979) (per se rules apply to professions in some situations).
900
 See, e.g., Everhart, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 73,897-98.
907 National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 921 U.S. 773 (1975).
1 " See supra notes 404-05.
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Until the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,""
practice of the learned professions was not considered "trade or commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act."° Consequently, the learned professions enjoyed complete
immunity from Sherman Act scrutiny.'" In Goldfarb, the Court held that professional
activity is not exempt from the Sherman Act,'" and that a mandatory fee schedule
published by a state bar association violates the Act.' The Goldfarb Court reasoned that
the practice of law has a "business aspect."'" The language of the Sherman Act clearly
manifests an attempt by Congress to bring activity under the Act.' There is no reason,
therefore, to assume that Congress intended the practice of law to be exempt from the
Act.46 Accordingly, no such exemption for the law, or any other profession, should be
read into the Sherman Act by the courts.'"
Although the Goldfarb Court clearly rejected the notion of a blanket Sherman Act
exemption for the professions, the Court added the following dictum:
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect,
and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently."
The Court's observation implies that certain professional activities might still enjoy a
limited exemption from the Sherman Act. In addition, the dictum implies that antitrust
analysis of professional activity might differ from antitrust analysis of industrial and
commercial activity. In fact, the analysis applied by the Court in Goldfarb seemed to differ
somewhat from the analysis it had applied in past cases involving price fixing by groups
in other industries."
Price fixing has long been considered a per se offense 4 20 The Goldfarb opinion,
however, never mentioned the per se rule against price fixing. Nevertheless, the Court
seemed to adopt a per se approach, since "procompetitive" justifications for the price
Fixing scheme were not discussed as they would have been under the alternative "Rule of
Reason" balancing approach. In essence, the Goldfarb Court did not clearly apply either of
the traditional Sherman Act analyses. This fact, together with the Court's dictum that the
professions might be "treated differently" for antitrust purposes from other industries,'"
"9 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
"° See Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932); Federal
Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); but see United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
411 Dolan & Ralson, supra note 5, at 735.
412 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 789 (1976).
4 ' 3 Id.
414
 Id. at 788.
415 Id .
"a Id. at 789.
417 Id .
4" Id. at 788 n.17.
99 Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) with Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1976).
4" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
421 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1976).
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first spawned uncertainty among lower courts and commentators concerning the applica-
bility of the per se rules to anticompetitive activity by the professions,'"
The next case to come before the Court involving Sherman Act violations by the
professions, National Society of Professional Engineers v, United States,' added to the
confusion over the proper Sherman Act analysis for professional activity. 424 In Engineers,
the Court affirmed a circuit court decision"' which held that the Society's ban of
competitive bidding was per se illegal."' Nevertheless, as in Goldfarb, the Court did not
explicitly use either a per se or a "Rule of Reason" analysis."'
The petitioners in Professional Engineers admitted that their ban of competitive bid-
ding restrained price competition among engineers."' The petitioners claimed, however,
that such a restraint was justified because price competition would harm the quality of
engineering services, and thereby threaten public safety."' The central issue addressed
by the Court was whether this argument was admissible. The Court reasoned that the
petitioners' argument amounted to the claim that competition itself is undesirable in this
context."' Since the assumption underlying the Sherman Act is that free competition is
always desirahle, 43' the petitioner's claim amounted to "frontal assault on the basic policy
of the Sherman Act." 432 The Court held, therefore, that petitioner's argument failed
under any Sherman Act analysis!" This holding made it unnecessary for the Court to
specify whether a per se or a "Rule of Reason" analysis should be applied to price fixing
arrangements by the professions. As a result, uncertainty remained as to the applicability
of the per se rules to professional activity.
Most lower courts and commentators read Goldfarb and Professional Engineers as
exempting the professions from the per se rules.'" Consequently, staff privilege denial
cases were analyzed under the "Rule of Reason" even where the court acknowledged that
the privilege denial was a group boycott."' These courts reasoned that the professions
were exempt from the per se rules because antitrust analysis of professional activity was
relatively new. 43" A lack of knowledge concerning the inner workings of the professions
made it impossible for courts to predict the effects that a particular restraint of trade
would have on professional services."' Since courts could not predict the effects of
particular rest Faints, a full "Rule of Reason" analysis of these restraints was necessary to
determine what effects the restraints would have."'" Under this line of reasoning, then, a
422 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
' 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
4 " See Kissam, supra note 10, at 644 n.239..
425 United States v. National Soc'y for Professional Engineers, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
arri, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
United States v. National Soc'y for Professional Engineers, 555 F.2d at 981-84.
427 Kissam, supra note 10, at 644 n.239.
United States v. National Soc'y For Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 684 (1978).






 See supra notes 404-05.
436 See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
' Everhart v. Jane Stormont Hosp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1i 64,703 at 73,897.
4" Id.
436 Id.
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"Rule of Reason" rather than a per se analysis must be used in all cases involving the
professions, including challenges to staff privilege denials:436
In its most recent case involving antitrust violations by the professions, Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society,' the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the above argu-
ment,441 and held that the medical profession is not exempt from the per se m1,042
Maricopa involved a maximum fee schedule imposed by a county medical society 9 93 The
Medical Society argued that the Sherman Act's per se rule against price fixing should not
be applied to the medical profession because the judiciary has little antitrust experience
with the health care industry . 444 Until the judiciary knew enough about the health care
industry to predict the effect of a particular trade restraint, a per se rule, which inevitably
incorporates such a prediction, could not be justified.'" This argument did not convince
the Supreme Court. 446 The Court reasoned that the necessity of rejustifying per se rules
for each industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation would under-
mine the purpose of the per se rules.447 These rules are designed to avoid complicated
judicial inquiries into the nature of the industry involved to determine the competitive
effects of the challenged restraint. 4" If the rules had to be rejustified for each new
industry, courts would constantly be making the type of complicated inquiries that the per
se rules were designed to avoid. 4" The adoption of aper se rule reflects a judgment by the
Court, based on experience in many industries, that a particular restraint is almost certain
to be unreasonable. 450 Once such a judgment has been made, the per se rule applies
uniformly to all industries, including the professions."' The Court concluded: "The
respondent's arguments against the application of the Per Se rules in this case are better
directed at the legislature. Congress may consider the exception that we are not free to
read into the statute."461 This statement seems to imply that no exemption to the per se rules
will be granted to the professions absent a clear directive by Congress.
Although Maricopa involved the per se rule against price fixing, the Court's rationale
for applying this rule to the medical profession clearly would support the application of
the group boycott rule as well.'" The boycott rule, like the price fixing rule, is the result
of the Court's judgment that a particular type of trade restraint is almost certain to be
unreasonable. 454 This judgment obviates the need to consider the restraint's effects in the
439 Id.
4 " 457 U.S. 332, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
44 ` Id. at 349-50, 102 S. Ct. at 2476.
442 Id .
"3 Id. at 339-41, 102 S. Ct. at 2470.71.
444




440 Id. at 351, 102 S. Ct. at 2476-77.
449  Id.
45° Id. at 349, 102 S. Ct. at 2476.
451 Id .
452 Id. at 354-55, 102 S. Ct. at 2.78-79.
453 This conclusion is supported by the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp., 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, U.S. 51 U.S.L.W. 3649 (1983), which held
that, under Maricopa, the tying arrangement per se rule does apply to the medical profession. Id. at
293-94.
4 " Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457,
468 (1941).
418	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:383
particular circumstances of each case:ass The utility of the boycott rule, like the price
fixing rule, lies in the rule's promotion of judicial economy and business certainty. 456
 This
utility would be undercut if the per . se rules applied to some industries and not others. 457
Therefore, the boycott rule, like the price fixing rule, must apply to all industries alike.
It is thus fair to conclude that under Maricopa, privilege denials which involve group
boycotts are per se violations. Nevertheless, Maricopa did not foreclose the possibility,
noted in both Go/dfarb458 and Professional Engineers,'" that anticompetitive activity which
would be illegal for other industries might be justifiable for the professions. 46 ° Staff
privilege denials might be one of these justifiable activities. Accordingly, an examination
of these cases is warranted to determine what types of anticompetitive activities by the
professions might be justifiable.
The Maricopa Court, citing Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, implied that anticom-
petitive practices which legitimately enhance "the quality of professional services" might
be permissible."' This doctrine seems to open the door for a Sherman Act affirmative
defense which is unique to the professions. The affirmative defense would allow the
professions to escape liability for anticompetitive practices provided they could establish
that the challenged practice legitimately enhanced the quality of professional services. 482
If such an affirmative defense exists, it is not without some qualifications. Clearly, under
Professional Engineers, no justification is permitted which incorporates the assumption that
competition itself is undesirable."' Accordingly, justifications based on the enhancement
of professional services must be grounded on claims that the challenged practice is
desirable despite rather than because of its restraint of competition. In practice, this
means a defendant will have to assert that the benefits of the challenged practice in terms
of the quality of professional services outweigh the harm caused by the challenged
practices in terms of restraints of competition.'" Although this analysis sounds like the
weighing of effects under the rule of reason, 465
 it is significantly different in two respects.
First, under the rule of reason, the negative effects on competition are weighed against
the positive effects on competition.'" Under the "professional quality" defense, however,
the negative effects on competition are weighed against the positive effects on the quality
of professional services."' Second, under the "professional quality" defense, it is defen-
dant rather than plaintiff that bears the burden of proof.. 46H Defendant, rather than
plaintiff, must demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of the challenged practice are
outweighed by the enhancement of professional services.
453 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982).
456 Id. at 354.
437
 Id. at 349-51.
'" 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
"9
 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).




	 States v. National Soc'y for Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
484 Deferidant could not assert that the quality of professional services was enhanced because of
the lack of competition. This was precisely the argument rejected in United States v. National Soc'y
for Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696.
"3 See supra text accompanying note 203.
466 Id.
467 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982).
460 Compare supra note 202 and accompanying text with Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982).
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Another qualification for the "professional quality" defense can be distilled from
Silver a. New York Stock Exchange. 469 Under Silver restraints which are not narrowly tailored
for the particular harm sought to be prevented cannot be justified."' Moreover, if the
restraint takes the form of a regulation, it must incorporate procedural safeguards."'
Restraints which do not meet these requirements could not be justified regardless of their
positive effects on the quality of professional services.
The "professional quality" defense would thus allow a defendant to escape Sherman
Act liability if the defendant could show:
1. That the anticompetitive effect of the challenged practice was outweighed by
enhancement of the quality of professional services; 472
2. That the challenged practice was the least anticompetitive way of enhancing
professional services; 473 and
3. If the challenged practice involved a regulation, that the regulation incorporated
procedural safeguards to insure that those negatively affected by the regulation were
accorded notice and an opportunity to be hearcl. 474
A "professional quality" defense such as the one formulated above would clearly be
available to defendants in some privilege denial cases. A defendant .would have to
demonstrate first that the privilege applicant was accorded procedural due process.' In
addition, a defendant would have to show that the challenged privilege denial was
merit-based, or, in other words, that the qualifications of the privilege applicant failed to
meet hospital standards. Presumably, non-merit-based denials would not meet either the
first or second requirements because they in no way enhance the quality of professional
services.476 An applicant who meets or exceeds all hospital standards cannot be said to
detract from the quality of the medical staff. The second requirement is not met for the
same reason. Denials which do not eliminate substandard applicants are not tailored to
enhance the quality of the medical staff. The defendant hospital board or medical staff,
therefore, will prevail under the "professional quality" defense only if it can prove that
the challenged privilege denial was, or could have been based on the actual qualifications
of the privilege applicant.
In summary, the recent Supreme Court holdings in Maricopa, that per se rules apply to
the health care profession, dictates that privilege denials which involve group boycotts are
per se illegal. Nevertheless, Maricopa implies that an affirmative defense may be available
in cases involving merit-based privilege denials. If this defense exists, the procedural
effect of a finding that a privilege denial amounts to a group boycott would be to shift the
burden of proof to the defendent, who must then establish that the privilege denial
enhanced the quality of professional services at the hospital.
"" 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
"° Id. at 358.
4" Id. at 364.
* 72 See supra text accompanying notes 461 -68.
473 See supra text accompanying note 470.
474 See supra text accompanying note 471.
4 " Id.
476 A possible case where non-merit based denials might support a professional quality defense
is where an exclusive contract is necessary in order for the hospital to provide a certain patient
service. This would be the case, for example, where a smaller rural hospital needed to offer a
specialist an exclusive contract in his specialty area in order to attract him to a location which might
not provide him with enough patients for a profitable practice in the event he had to compete with
other physicians. Similarly, an exclusive contract for the supply of emergency room services might be
necessary to insure that a group of physicians will provide services twenty-four hours a day.
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V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE GROUP BOYCOTT RULE
This note has demonstrated that the Sherman Act's group boycott rule applies to
class-based, contract-based, and retaliatory hospital staff privilege denials. Moreover, the
assumption underlying the boycott rule, that concerted refusals to deal unreasonably
restrain competition, supports the application of the rule to all staff privilege denials.
Under current law, group boycotts are per se illegal in all industries, including the
professions. Accordingly, a plaintiff challenging a staff privilege denial could use the
group boycott rule to avoid the difficult showing, required under the rule of reason, that
the anticompetitive effects of the privilege denial outweigh the procompetitive effects.
The boycott rule allows a plaintiff to rely on a presumption that concerted refusals to deal
unreasonably restrain competition. A plaintiff meets his burden of proof, therefore,
merely by demonstrating that the privilege denial amounts to a group boycott. If a
plaintiff makes this showing, he will prevail unless the defendant hospital board or
medical staff can avail themselves of a "professional quality" defense. The defense might
allow the defendant to escape liability for a group boycott if the defendant can show that the
boycott legitimately enhanced the quality of professional services.
Use of the boycott rule in privilege denial cases will have a profound effect on
privilege administration. If challenged in court, hospital boards and medical staffs will be
required to justify privilege denials by demonstrating that the qualifications of the privi-
lege applicant did not meet hospital standards. Consequently, the hospital board and
medical staff will be required, as a precautionary measure, to carefully evaluate the
qualifications of each applicant practitioner to determine whether the applicant meets
hospital standards. This evaluation will bring to light evidence concerning the profes-
sional competence of the practitioner. The availability of this evidence may facilitate
action against incompetent practitioners at the state licensing level. Hospital boards may
be encouraged to turn this evidence over to state licensing boards because an investigation
by the latter, and a subsequent removal of the practitioner's license, would take the
pressure off the hospital board to grant the practitioner privileges. Thus, incompetent
applicant practitioners would have their licenses to practice revoked, rather than be
denied staff privileges and allowed to continue practicing. Such a result would clearly
benefit the consumer of medical services who generally has no way of assessing a prac-
titioner's competence until it is too late.
In addition to facilitating the elimination of incompetent practitioners, application of
the boycott rule to privilege denials would give the consumer of medical services greater
freedom of choice in selecting practitioners and hospitals. Because all qualified applicants
would be granted staff privileges, the hospital board and medical staff would be unable to
restrain competition within the hospital by restricting the number of practitioners with
access to hospital facilities. Practitioners would be able to obtain privileges at several
hospitals and give their patients a choice. Moreover, patients in any given hospital would
have more privileged practitioners to choose from. Competition between practitioners
and between hospitals to attract patients would increase, resulting in a greater variety of
services and prices available to each patient. This result is precisely what the Sherman Act
is designed to achieve. Accordingly, application of the boycott rule in privilege denial
cases would clearly be consistent with the aim of the Sherman Act, and in the best interests
of the consumer of medical services.
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This note has assessed the Sherman Act Group Boycott Rule as a potential legal
response to anticompetitive practices in current hospital staff privilege administration.
The central problem that has been addressed is the denial of staff privileges to licensed
applicant practitioners for reasons wholly unrelated to the applicant's qualifications and
abilities, reasons such as disapproval of medical organizations in which the applicant
participates, discrimination against the applicant's practical discipline, and the existence
of an exclusivity agreement between the hospital and a physician practice group which
prohibits the hiring of the applicant because he is not a member of the contracting
practice group. Courts should find that these types of privilege denials are Group
Boycotts under the leading Group Boycott cases. Moreover, courts should conclude that,
under a recent Supreme Court case, group boycotts in the context of the medical
profession are per se violations of the Sherman Act, absent an affirmative showing by the
defendant that the challenged rest raint is necessary to maintain the quality of professional
services. Accordingly, applicants who are denied staff privileges should now be able to use
the Group Boycott Rule to shift the burden of proof to the defendant hospital or medical
staff to justify the privilege denial. The result of this shift should be to force hospitals to
grant privileges to all applicants absent a legitimate, quality-related reason for denying
privileges. Consequently, practitioners will have access to the facilities of more hospitals,
and hospitals will have more practitioners on their staffs. This change will ultimately
benefit the hospital patient. First, since practitioners will have privileges at more hospitals,
their patients will have more hospitals to choose from. Hospitals, therefore, will need to
compete for these patients by lowering prices and increasing services. Similarly, since
hospitals will have more practitioners on their staffs, hospital patients will have more
practitioners to choose from. Competition between practitioners, therefore, will also
increase. Hence, application of the Group Boycott Rule to staff privilege denials would
effectuate the purpose of the Sherman Act by increasing competition and thus benefiting
the consumer of medical services.
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